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EDUCATION LAW ABSTRACT:
A SURVEY OF PROMINENT ISSUES
IN MISSISSIPPI'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Pamela W Dill*
The Mississippi Constitution requires the Mississippi Legislature to "provide
for the establishment, maintenance and support of free public schools."' Pursuant
to this mandate, all Mississippi children are guaranteed the right to an education.
In order to protect this most vital right, state law not only provides the mecha-
nisms by which public school districts are created, organized and maintained, but
also addresses individual rights and responsibilities of public school students and
employees. Additionally, the United States Constitution and federal statutory law
provide guarantees of personal rights which must be protected and requirements of
educational accountability which must be met in the administration of the public
school system. It is within the framework of these ever-evolving laws that public
education functions in Mississippi.
Mississippi's public school teachers, administrators, boards, and attorneys
share a continuing concern with a variety of legal issues which affect the day-to-
day operation of the schools as well as the ability to provide a safe, productive
learning environment. This article will provide an overview of the basic opera-
tional provisions and synopses of some of the most significant issues facing Mis-
sissippi school districts today, as outlined below:2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Compulsory Attendance
B. Student Assignment and Transfer
C. Alternative Schools
D. Immunity




* The author is an attorney with the law firm of Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes, in Jackson, Mississippi.
A former Mississippi public school teacher, Mrs. Dill's primary area of practice is education law.
1. MIss. CONST. art. VIII, §201 (1890).
2. This article will not address a number of issues which are equally as important to the proper functioning of
the state's public schools, including, but not limited to, the state laws concerning open meetings, taxation, bonds
and obligations, funding, budgets, purchasing, contracting, construction, sixteenth section lands, special educa-
tion, early education programs, transportation, textbooks, the federal laws concerning desegregation, the Voting
Rights Act, Title IX, the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 1983 and § 1981 actions, equal employment oppor-
tunity matters and special education.
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D. Freedom of Religion
E. Freedom of Speech
E Release of Student Records
III. EMPLOYMENT MATTERS





Mississippi public school districts are political subdivisions of the state.' Each
district is governed by a local school board consisting of five trustees, each of
whom must be both residents and qualified electors of the district.4 Depending on
the type of district, board members selected for five-year terms are either ap-
pointed by the governing body of the municipality or county, elected by the voters
of the county or selected as otherwise provided by law.' Upon selection to a board
position and each year thereafter, each board member is required to complete a
course of training and continuing education.6
The school board operates its district pursuant to broad statutory powers and
duties, all necessary to perform the functions essential to the educational pro-
grams mandated by the state.7 The school board can take official action only by
the action of a majority of its members; thus, the individual board members hold
no authority over the schools.'
Each district is managed by a superintendent, who is either appointed by the
school board or elected as provided by law.' While the superintendent is bound to
implement the decisions of the school board, he is granted broad statutory powers
and duties with which to administer the daily operation of the district's schools.10
A. Compulsory Attendance
The Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law1 requires every child
who is six years old on or before September 1 or who has not reached age seven-
teen on or before September 1 to be enrolled in a public or legitimate private
3. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-6-5 (1990).
4. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-6-7 (1990).
5. MiSS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-7-203 to -229 (1990).
6. Mass. CODE ANN. § 37-7-306 (Supp. 1993).
7. MSS. CODE ANN. § 37-7-301 (1990).
8. Mss. CODE ANN. § 37-6-9 (1990).
9. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-13 (1990).
10. MSS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-14 (Supp. 1993).
11. Mss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-91 to -92 (Supp. 1993).
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school. 12 The only three exceptions to the attendance requirement exist when a
child is (1) physically, mentally or emotionally incapable of attending school; (2)
enrolled in and pursuing a special, remedial or disability-related course of educa-
tion; or (3) being educated in a legitimate home instruction program. 13
When a compulsory-school-age child has not been enrolled within fifteen days
of the first day of the school year or has accumulated five unlawful absences, the
superintendent is responsible for notifying the school attendance officer at the lo-
cal youth or family court.14 An "unlawful" absence occurs when a valid excuse is
not presented for temporary nonattendance. " The law provides nine valid excuses
for student absences: authorized school activities, illness or injury, isolation or-
dered by a health official, death or serious illness of an immediate family member,
medical or dental appointments, court orders or actions, religious observances,
participation in valid educational opportunities, and other conditions which jus-
tify non-attendance.' 8
The school attendance officer is responsible for working with the schools and
the youth or family court in locating and identifying all compulsory-school-age
children who are not attending schools. 7 The school attendance officer is also
charged with investigative and counseling duties.I If he is unable to secure enroll-
ment or attendance, the school attendance officer must file a petition with the
youth court and a hearing in the matter must be expedited. 9
B. Student Assignment and Transfer
A student must enroll and attend school in the district of his residence unless he
is lawfully transferred elsewhere.2" For purposes of establishing residency, a dis-
trict may not recognize a legal guardianship formed for the purpose of school at-
tendance. 21
The law provides three exceptions to this general residency requirement. First,
the child of a certificated non-resident employee may attend school in the district
of his parent's employment.22 The employer school board must consent to such a
transfer.2 A district may expand this exception to permit the transfer of children of
non-certificated non-resident employees as well.24 However, the employer district
cannot charge tuition to students it accepts under these circumstances25 and must
12. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(2)(f, (3) (Supp. 1993).
13. Id. § 37-13-91(3) (Supp. 1993).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 37-13-91(4).
16. Id. § 37-13-91(4)(a)-(i).
17. Id. § 37-13-91(7) (Supp. 1993).
18. Id.
19. Id. Such action must be taken pursuant to Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-451 (1993).
20. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-29 (Supp. 1993).
21. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-31(1)(d) (Supp. 1993).
22. Mss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-29(2) (Supp. 1993).
23. Mss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-31(2)(a) (Supp. 1993).
24. Id. § 37-15-31(2)(b).
25. Id. § 37-15-31(2)(e).
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notify the transferee district of its acceptance of such transfers. 26 In both cases, the
parents have the responsibility for transporting the student absent an agreement
otherwise. 27
Second, a student who must travel more than thirty miles by bus from home to
the school in his district of residence may transfer to an adjacent district if his resi-
dence is located on a shorter bus route to a school in the adjacent district.28 Both
the sending and receiving boards must consent to such transfer.29 If the sending
and receiving districts fail to agree on which will provide transportation, the par-
ent will be responsible for transporting the student to the receiving school."
Finally, a third exception was added to the transfer rule in 1992. " A receiving
district must continue to accept students who were lawfully transferred prior to
July 1, 1992, if the students choose to remain in the district. 2 A district is also
required to consent to the transfer of siblings of such lawfully transferred stu-
dents.
In circumstances where none of the three exceptions apply, a student may still
obtain a legal transfer from the district of his residence to another by the mutual
consent of the boards of both the sending and receiving districts.34 The boards
must act on a student's transfer petition not later than the next regular meeting fol-
lowing receipt of the request, and a failure to so act constitutes a rejection of the
transfer request. 35 The boards may enter into an agreement regarding the funding
of transferred students and a receiving district may require transferred students to
pay tuition.
36
Once a student is enrolled, the district has the authority to assign the student to
the appropriate school and classroom.3 7 Districts are specifically prohibited from
assigning a student to classrooms or schools where his presence due to age, devel-
opment or personal habits would adversely affect the academic development of
other students.
C. Alternative Schools
Beginning with the 1993-94 school year, school boards are required to create
and operate alternative school programs for certain classes of compulsory-school-
age children ." As part of the compulsory school law, these special alternative pro-
26. Id. § 37-15-31(2)(c).
27. Id. § 37-15-31(2)(d).
28. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-29(3) (Supp. 1993).
29. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-31(3) (Supp. 1993).
30. Id.
31. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-29(4) (Supp. 1993).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-31(1) (Supp. 1993).
35. Id. § 37-15-31(1)(c).
36. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-19-27 (Supp. 1993).
37. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-1 (1990).
38. Id.
39. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-92(2) (Supp. 1993).
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grams are intended to keep three specific categories of students in the classroom:
(1) students referred by a chancellor or youth court judge, including nonviolent ju-
venile offenders confined in a youth court facility; (2) students who have dropped
out, been suspended or expelled, or committed disciplinary infractions which will
result in expulsion; and (3) students referred by a parent, legal guardian, or custo-
dian due to discipline problems."
Adjacent districts are permitted to join together in a cooperative effort to pro-
vide alternative programs.41 The programs must be accredited through the State
Department of Education.42
D. Immunity'
In the 1982 decision of Pruett v. City of Rosedale," the Mississippi Supreme
Court abolished judicially-created sovereign immunity in tort suits for injuries
caused by the state and its political subdivisions; however, it did so prospectively
only, deferring the details of abolition to the Legislature.4" In 1984, the Missis-
sippi Legislature responded to Pruen by enacting the Sovereign Immunity Act of
1984. " Each year thereafter, the Legislature extended the effective date of the Act
by one year, thus providing the State and its political subdivisions with continuous
protection from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.4" In 1992, the Leg-
islature substantively revised the Act but continued its prospective effect by limit-
ing it to claims arising on or after October 1, 1993.1
The 1992 revision of the Act continued to provide that claims arising prior to its
effective date were "governed by the case law governing sovereign immunity as it
existed immediately prior to the decision in Pruett. . .and by the statutory law
[relevant to those claims]."'I On August 31, 1992, the Mississippi Supreme Court
issued Presley v. Mississippi Highway Commission,0 which held this particular lan-
guage to be unconstitutional.51 However, the court determined that Presley should
be applied only from the date of its decision. 2 In so finding, the court effectively
abolished sovereign immunity for the period between the issuance of the Presley
decision and the effective date of the Act. The Presley decision left school districts
40. Id.
41. Id. § 37-13-92(4).
42. Id. § 37-13-92(3).
43. This discussion addresses only sovereign and qualified immunity in tort actions under state law. Determi-
nations of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and qualified
immunity in federal cases are based on standards separate and apart from those discussed here.
44. 421 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1982).
45. Id. at 1052.
46. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-1 to -21 (Supp. 1993) (The Act is now referred to as the "Tort Claims Act.").
47. See Richardson v. Rankin County Sch. Dist., 540 So. 2d 5, 8 (Miss. 1989).
48. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1993).
49. Id.
50. 608 So. 2d 1288 (Miss. 1992).
5 1. Id. at 1296. The Presley court fbund that Mss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-6 was unconstitutional on the grounds
that it violated the separation of powers clause of Article I Section I and Article VI Section 144 and the enactment
by reference clause of Article IV Section 61 of the Mississippi Constitution. Id. at 1295-97.
52. Id. at 1301.
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and other state and local government agencies struggling to define the ramifica-
tions of the court's sudden removal of immunity and to protect themselves from
liability.
Less than three weeks following Presley, a special session of the Legislature
was called to deal with the issue of sovereign immunity. The Legislature repealed
the offensive statute13 and amended the Act so that absolute sovereign immunity
was reinstated until the Act's effective date.' Thus, for the period following Pre-
sley and the subsequent legislative actions, school districts remained in essentially
the same position: pre-Pruett case law was to be applied to claims arising prior to
October 1, 1993, and the Act was to apply to claims arising thereafter.
However, in Churchill v. Pearl River Basin Development District,5 the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court continued its attack on sovereign immunity, leaving districts
again uncertain as to its vulnerability to suit. Churchill leveled three more blows to
immunity. First, the court expressly overruled a long line of prior decisions by
finding statutory authorization to purchase insurance to be an implicit waiver of
immunity to the limits of the insurance coverage. 6 Second, the court held that
sovereign immunity had no application to claims based on the existence of an im-
plied contract.57 Finally, the court announced that the portion of the Presley deci-
sion which made its application prospective only was not binding. 8 Thus,
Churchill left school districts vulnerable to lawsuits in all instances covered by in-
surance and in cases where an implied contract argument can be made. Further-
more, Churchill left questions concerning the applicability of Presley.
In direct response to Churchill, the Legislature amended the law to expressly
include implied contracts.5" Therefore, at the time of this writing, public school
districts may continue to claim sovereign immunity, and its employees may con-
tinue to claim qualified immunity for all actions arising prior to October 1, 1993,
the effective date of the Act.
60
53. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1993).
54. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3(1) (Supp. 1993).
55. 619 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1993).
56. Id. at 905.
57. Id. at 903. The Churchill case involved a claim for personal injuries suffered when the plaintiff dove into
shallow water at a state-owned/county-operated water park. Id. at 901-02. Because the county charged an admis-
sion fee, the court held that it had entered into an implied contract with the plaintiff, a part of which was a promise
that the premises were safe for the enjoyment of water sports. Id. at 903. The court relied on two Alabama Su-
preme Court cases, one of which dealt with a claim against a school district arising from the collapse of a bleacher
at a football game. Id. at 902.
58. Id. at 904. In Presley, only four justices joined that portion of the decision which held the abolition of
immunity to be effective prospectively only. Presley v. Mississippi Highway Comm'n, 608 So. 2d 1288, 1301
(Miss. 1992). The Churchill court found that because a majority of the court had not joined in that portion of the
opinion, then it has no precedential effect. Churchill, 619 So. 2d at 904.
59. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3(1) (Supp. 1993).
60. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-1 (Supp. 1993).
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1. Pre-Pruett Law
Historically, school districts have enjoyed continuous protection from civil
suits under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.61 This absolute immunity from
tort actions could be pierced only if liability is authorized by statute, either ex-
pressly or by implication.62 Because none of the specific powers and duties
granted to school districts provided that districts could sue or be sued,63 no express
general authority to sue a district existed.
Until October 1, 1993, specific authority for tort suits against a school district
existed for very particularized situations only and with express limits of liability. 6
First, a district's purchase of liability insurance on any vehicle operated by it re-
sulted in an express waiver of immunity to the extent of the insurance.65 Second,
the purchase of workers' compensation liability insurance also subjected a district
to a limited waiver of immunity.66 Third, a district's purchase of general liability
insurance resulted in a limited waiver of immunity for acts covered under such a
policy.6 7 Fourth, a district could be sued for personal injury or property damage
incurred as a result of a bus accident.6 ' Finally, a district could sue or be sued
based on a breach of contract theory. 9
No other express waivers of immunity existed prior to or were enacted after
Pruett. The courts continued to follow pre-Pruett case law which found no implied
waiver of immunity in the purchase of liability insurance.7" In all other situations,
school districts were consistently found to be absolutely immune from suits arising
from both negligent and intentional torts.71
61. See Richardson v. Rankin County Sch. Dist., 540 So. 2d 5, 8 (Miss. 1989).
62. French v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 394 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Miss. 1981); State Highway
Comm'n v. Gulley, 145 So. 351, 354 (Miss. 1933); Ayres v. Board of Trustees, 98 So. 847, 850 (Miss. 1924).
63. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-7-301 (Supp. 1993). The statute which previously empowered districts in-
cluded authority to do -all things necessary to the successful operation of the school'; however, the Mississippi
Supreme Court found that even that broad grant of authority did not imply that a district could be sued. Ayres, 98
So. at 850. When compared with its more suggestive and broad predecessor, the specific language of the current
statute presents a strong argument against a district being vulnerable to suit.
64. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
65. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-7-304 (Supp. 1993).
66. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-7-303(2) (Supp. 1993).
67. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-7-319 (Supp. 1993).
68. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-41-39, -41 (Supp. 1993). Claims resulting from bus accidents were paid from
the Accident Contingent Fund and were limited to actual costs up to $1,000.00 for personal and property claims
and, if a lawsuit is filed, to damages up to $10,000.00 per person and $50,000.00 per accident for personal in-
jury. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-41-41 (Supp. 1993). These limitations of liability have been fbund to be nonviola-
tive of substantive due process, because they bear a rational relationship to the legitimate purpose of protecting
state funds. Turrentine v. Brookhaven Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
69. See Grenada Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Jesco, Inc., 449 So. 2d 226 (Miss. 1984). See also Mississippi
State Dep't of Welfare v. Howie, 449 So. 2d 772 (Miss. 1984); Cig Contractors, Inc. v. Mississippi State Bldg.
Comm'n, 399 So. 2d 1352 (Miss. 1981).
70. Strait v. Pat Harrison Waterways Dist., 523 So. 2d 36 (Miss. 1988); Joseph v. Tennessee Partners, Inc.,
501 So. 2d 371 (Miss. 1987) (following French v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 394 So. 2d 1385 (Miss.
1981)).
71. See, e.g., Boyd v. Gulfport Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 821 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1987); McFadden v. State,
542 So. 2d 871 (Miss. 1989).
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Pre-Pruet law also extended qualified immunity to public officials and em-
ployees in order to promote efficient and timely decision making without the offi-
cials having to fear personal liability for error.72 Mississippi courts long
recognized that the absolute protection of sovereign immunity was inapplicable
"where a suit [was] against [a] governmental official individually and the state
[was] not a party, nor would the relief demanded require the state to take any af-
firmative action."73 Qualified immunity provided public school employees protec-
tion from civil liability for acts resulting from discretionary, but not ministerial,
functions."
In addition to qualified immunity, state statute continues to specifically provide
school personnel, including bus drivers, with absolute immunity from criminal or
civil liability as a result of maintaining student discipline except where excessive
force or cruel and unusual punishment is used.7" School employees are also given
immunity from civil or criminal action for actions taken in compliance with their
duty to report suspected child abuse.76
2. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act
The Mississippi Tort Claims Act continues to grant broad sovereign immunity
for acts and omissions of governmental entities, whether governmental, proprie-
tary, discretionary or ministerial.77 This Act, however, waives the statutory im-
munity up to maximum limits of liability set on a sliding scale intended to limit the
impact of this new general waiver of immunity.78
Under the Act, all governmental entities retain their immunity in several areas
which are expressly excepted from the Act's waiver of immunity.79 Entities and
their employees who are acting in the course and scope of their employment con-
tinue to be immune from claims under several circumstances: taking or failing to
take legislative, judicial or administrative action; exercising of discretion in pro-
viding or failing to provide resources or services; planning or designing construc-
72. State v. Lewis, 498 So. 2d 321 (Miss. 1986).
73. Davis v. Little, 362 So. 2d 642 (Miss. 1978).
74. Poyner v. Gilmore, 158 So. 922, 923 (Miss. 1935). A discretionary function is one that requires personal
judgment and discretion in its performance while a ministerial function is one that is imposed by law and requires
no personal judgment in its performance. Id. at 923.
75. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57 (Supp. 1993).
76. Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (1993). The Child Welfare Reporting Law requires any person, including
school principals and teachers, who has reasonable cause to suspect that a child is neglected or abused, to make a
oral report immediately and a written report as soon thereafter as possible to the Mississippi Department of
Health and Human Services. Id. § 43-21-353(1)d. Where the knowledge of suspicion of such neglect or abuse is
obtained in the performance of school-related services, the person with such information must notify the super-
intendent or his designated delegate, who is then responsible for making the report to the welfare department. Id.
§ 43-21-353(3). Reports made under this law are confidential except when the investigating court finds the testi-
mony of the reporting person to be material to adjudication. Id.
77. Mss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3 (Supp. 1993).
78. Id. The maximum limits of liability escalate every four years. For claims arising on or after October 1,
1993, and before October 1, 1997, districts may be liable for up to $50,000.00; on or after October 1, 1997, and
before October 1,2001, up to $250,000.00; on or after October 1, 2001, up to $500,000.00. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 11-46-15 (Supp. 1993).
79. Id.
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tion or improvements to public property; failing to warn of a dangerous condition
obvious to one exercising due care; and adopting or failing to adopt regulations.8"
All political subdivisions are required to purchase liability insurance or to set
up self-insurance reserves sufficient to cover the maximum limits of liability set
out by the Act. 81 Political subdivisions are authorized to pool their liabilities
through insurance or self-insurance reserves.82 School districts are permitted, but
not required, to purchase insurance in excess of the statutory liability limits.83 If
excess insurance is purchased, immunity is waived to the extent of the policy
amount.' Districts must obtain approval of their chosen form of insurance from
the state's Tort Claims Board.8
The Act specifically states that a public school district employee who has acted
in the course and scope of his authority can be sued in his official capacity only
and cannot be held personally liable for damages resulting from such acts."s The
school district must provide a defense for an employee who is sued,87 and the dis-
trict's duty to defend continues even after termination of the employment.' The
only exceptions to this grant of employee immunity are in cases of intentional
torts, such as defamation, fraud and criminal offenses, where the district remains
shielded from liability.8" Thus, under the Act, the rules of qualified immunity are
no longer applicable.
A one-year statute of limitations is applicable to any tort action brought against
a school district.90 The Act also includes an exhaustion requirement, mandating
that notice of a claim be given to the district at least ninety days prior to filing a
lawsuit. 1 Such notice tolls the one-year period for ninety-five days. 2
II. STUDENTS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The United States Constitution guarantees certain personal rights to all citi-
zens." Because of the special considerations inherent in the school setting, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the need for special
limitations of these rights as applied to students.9 4 School authorities have the duty
80. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9 (Supp. 1993).
81. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-17(3) (Supp. 1993). To cover the monetary awards against governmental entit-
ies other than political subdivisions, the Act establishes a "Tort Claims Fund" which is intended to serve as a self-
insurance pool for those entities which choose to participate. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-17 (Supp. 1993).
82. Id. § 11-46-17(5).
83. Id. § 11-46-17(4).
84. Id.
85. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-19(1) (Supp. 1993).
86. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-7(2) (Supp. 1993).
87. Id. § 11-46-7(4).
88. Id. § 11-46-7(6).
89. Id. § 11-46-7(2).
90. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp. 1993).
91. Id. § 11-46-11(1), (2).
92. Id. § 11-46-11(3).
93. U.S. CNsT. amends. I-VI.
94. United States v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
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to maintain a safe and non-disruptive educational environment; therefore, it fol-
lows that they have the power to maintain order within their schools by demanding
student compliance with rules created for that purpose.
Some of the most recurring legal problems concerning students' rights are those
related to providing due process in disciplinary matters, conducting on-campus
searches, utilizing corporal punishment, imposing academic or other disciplinary
penalties, protecting First Amendment rights of religion and speech, and releasing
student information. In these areas the courts have attempted to balance the con-
stitutional rights of the students against the need of the schools to maintain disci-
pline and order.
A. Due Process
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids the state to deprive a student of his right to an education with-
out due process of law:
The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in
its schools, although concededly very broad, must be exercised consistently with
constitutional safe guards. Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize
a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is
protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for miscon-
duct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that clause.
95
Due process mandates that students be provided with both substantive and pro-
cedural safeguards.96 A student can challenge disciplinary penalties where either
or both of these constitutional protections are not afforded him in a manner appro-
priate under the circumstances.9 7
1. Substantive Due Process
The provision of substantive due process in a student discipline case is tradi-
tionally guided by a "reasonableness" standard. 98 For a penalty to be reasonable,
two elements must be present. First, the penalty must be rationally related to a
valid educational objective, such as providing a safe learning environment. 99 Sec-
ond, the severity of the penalty must be reasonable in relation to the student's con-
duct.1"' Basically, the determinative consideration of substantive due process is
whether the punishment fits the violation."10
95. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
96. Id.
97. Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So. 2d 455, 459 (Miss. 1986).
98. Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 625 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1980); Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v.
Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 241 (Miss. 1985).
99. Mitchell, 625 F.2d at 665; Byrd, 477 So. 2d at 241.
100. See Fisher v. Burkburnett Indep. Sch. Dist., 419 F Supp. 1200 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
101. Id. at 1205.
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Generally, Mississippi public school district superintendents and principals
have substantial power to discipline students,1"2 including the power to suspend
students from school "for good cause or for any reason for which the student may
be suspended, dismissed, or expelled by the school board."" 3 Each district has the
responsibility to adopt and implement its own plan which uses discipline as neces-
sary to meet the district's educational objectives.' 04 The courts will not interfere
with the district's exercise of discretion in disciplinary matters "so long as consti-
tutional parameters are not transgressed."0 5
2. Procedural Due Process
Under state and federal law, a student has a right to be afforded certain proce-
dures when subjected to possible loss of his right to an education.' Mississippi
statutes conform to the constitutional guarantees by requiring districts to go
through a process of notice and hearing in many areas, including student disci-
pline.
10 7
The Supreme Court has held that in disciplinary actions, such as suspending a
student for misconduct, the minimum procedural due process requirements ap-
ply.'08 First, the student must receive prior notice of the type of conduct that will
give rise to disciplinary action.'0 9 Mississippi law requires school districts to
adopt, implement and distribute copies of its discipline plan and student code of
conduct to all students, parents and school personnel. "' The code of conduct must
include "[sipecific grounds for disciplinary action" and "[p]rocedures to be fol-
lowed for acts requiring discipline. . . ."'" These statutory requirements should
102. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-7-301 (Supp. 1993). See Byrd, 477 So. 2d at 239.
103. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-71 (1990).
104. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-9-69 to -70 (1990).
105. Byrd, 477 So. 2d at 241 (citing Shows v. Freeman, 230 So. 2d 63, 64 (Miss. 1969); McLeod v. State ex
rel. Colmer, 122 So. 737, 738 (Miss. 1929)).
106. Fisher v. Burkburnett Indep. Sch. Dist., 419 E Supp. 1200, 1204 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
107. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-71 (1990).
108. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The standards discussed in this section apply only to regular stu-
dents. Mississippi's special education students must be afforded procedures in compliance with the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act and in accordance with the standards set forth in Mattie T. v. Holladay, 522 F.
Supp. 72 (N.D. Miss. 1981).
109. Goss, 419 U.S. at 576-79.
110. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-11-53, -55 (Supp. 1993).
111. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-55 (Supp. 1993). The student code of conduct must also include "[a]n explana-
tion of the responsibilities and rights of students with regard to attendance, respect for persons and property,
knowledge and observation of the rules of conduct, the right to learn, free speech and student publications, as-
sembly, privacy and participation in school programs and activities." Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-55(c). The disci-
pline plans must also notify parents that they are financially responsible for their "minor child's destructive acts
against school property . . ." and that they may be requested to appear at school for a conference regarding such
acts subject to a misdemeanor criminal charge for refusal or willful failure to appear or pay damages. Miss. CODE
ANN. § 37-11-53(2) (Supp. 1993). Districts may recover damages, not to exceed $20,000.00, from parents of
students, ages six through seventeen, "who maliciously and willfully [I damage or destroy [I" school property. Id.
§ 37-11-53(4). Parents are required to sign a statement verifying that they have received notice of the discipline
policy. Id. § 37-11-53(1). Districts must have their discipline plans audited by the state department of education
annually to insure compliance with state and federal law. Id.
19931
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
assist in ensuring that this initial element of due process is met in every circum-
stance.
Second, the student who is to be disciplined must be given the opportunity to be
heard prior to penalties being imposed.112 In Goss v. Lopez, " 3 the United States
Supreme Court determined that minimum procedural safeguards are necessary
for short term suspensions of ten days or less. 4 This minimum process is
achieved by the prior notice plus an informal hearing which need not consist of
anything more than the "give and take" between the student and administrator
prior to the penalty being assessed."' 5 Without giving specific rules, the Goss
Court stated that a higher level of procedural due process may be necessary in
cases of suspensions of more than ten days or of expulsions. 11 Based on that proc-
lamation, districts generally consider removal from school for more than ten days
to be "long term," requiring prior notice of the rules, an informal hearing with the
administrator and the opportunity for a more formal hearing. 17
As determined by local policy and practice, the superintendent or principal has
the responsibility of informing the parents of a student who is so disciplined that
they have the right to a due process hearing on the action.18 The notice and hear-
ing procedures afforded the student must be in compliance with federal guarantees
of due process. 9 In Mississippi, districts have creatively utilized various hearing
formats to afford more process in these long term removal cases. 20 A district's
procedures must depend on the parties, the subject matter and the particular cir-
cumstances. 12 A district's procedure will generally be constitutionally sufficient
unless the student suffers "substantial prejudice" as a result.
122
112. See infra note 108.
113. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
114. Id. at 576.
115. Keough v. Tate County Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 584 (1975)); Cole v. Newton Special Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 676 F Supp. 749, 751 (S.D. Miss.
1987), aft'd, 853 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 581-82).
116. Goss, 419 U.S. 584.
117. See Jones v. Pascagoula Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 524 So. 2d 968, 973 (Miss. 1988) (finding that the
amount of process due depends on the situation at hand). Although confrontation of witnesses is not a student's
right, hearsay testimony is admissible in a student discipline matter and, written statements, therefore, should be
available to the student. Id. The student should also be provided with a list of witnesses along with an explanation
of the charges against him. Id. (citing Keough, 748 F.2d at 1083).
118. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-71 (1990).
119. Id.
120. Some districts have successfully implemented plans which use discipline committees consisting of school
personnel which serve as a hearing board in all long term discipline cases. In all cases the student must be af-
forded the right to appear before the school board for review. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-71 (1990).
121. Keough, 748 F.2d at 1081 (citing Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970)).





School districts have both the legal authority and responsibility to utilize what-
ever disciplinary measures are deemed appropriate. 123 In addition to removal from
the classroom or some other penalty, academic penalties are frequently utilized
for or are imposed as a result of discipline.124 When a student's grades are affected
by discipline, special legal problems can arise.
When academic sanctions are used only in response to academic performance,
the courts will not interfere in the educator's evaluation. 1 5 However, when aca-
demic penalties are imposed as a disciplinary measure or as a result of disciplinary
removal from the school, the courts will scrutinize such use. 126 Challenges can be
leveled against academic penalties on the same substantive and procedural due
process grounds as can be made with suspensions or expulsions.127 Students can
also challenge academic penalties by claiming that such imposition is an ultra vires
act of the board, i.e., beyond the board's statutory authority."12
Mississippi school districts retain the discretion to set policies regarding how
student grades will be affected by discipline-related absences. 129 To avoid a viola-
tion of substantive due process, a district should determine that there is a clear
demonstration that reducing the student's grade due to such absences is reasonably
related to a valid educational objective.l3 ' Whether the actual academic penalty is
a reduced grade on make-up work or not being allowed to make-up missed
work,31 the penalty should reflect only the impact on the student's academic per-
formance for the days actually missed due to truancy, suspension, expulsion or
other absence. 132 A penalty may be upheld if the impact upon the student's overall
grade is not substantial. 3
Prior to imposing an academic penalty in conjunction with discipline, the
school district should consider whether notice and hearing is afforded. While pro-
cedural due process is not required in the case of academic decisions alone,"M
123. See MiSS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-9-69, -70 (1990).
124. See Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So. 2d 455 (Miss. 1986).
125. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
126. See Wilkinson, 500 So. 2d at 458 (student facing loss of credit by implication of suspension has property
interest protected by due process). See alsoJones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
127. Id.
128. See Bruce Beezer, Using Academic Grades to Discipline Students:A Legal Caution, 21 EDuc. L. Rpmn. 765
(1985).
129. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-9-69, -70 (1990).
130. See Katzman v. Cumberland, 479 A.2d 671 (Pa. Conunw. Ct. 1984); Campbell v. Board of Educ., 475
A.2d 289 (Conn. 1984); Knight v. Board of Educ., 348 N.E.2d 299 (Ill. App. 3d 1976).
131. No Mississippi court has considered whether school districts must allow suspended or expelled students to
make-up missed work. One Pennsylvania court has held that students must be given the opportunity to make-up
work. Katzman, 479 A.2d at 674. However, other courts have held that the opportunity to make-up missed work
with the exception of final exams is not required. See Donaldson v. Board of Educ., 424 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. App. 3d
1981).
132. See Katzman, 479 A.2d at 674-75; Fisher v. Burkburnett Indep. Sch. Dist., 419 F. Supp. 1200, 1205
(N.D. Tex. 1976).
133. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F2d 458 (5th Cir. 1974).
134. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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when the academic penalty is coupled with a suspension or expulsion, somewhat
greater procedural safeguards may be triggered. 1 ' Thus, if a student is faced with
losing grades as a result of disciplinary-related absences, the district would be
wise to afford the same procedural protections for the academic penalty as for the
suspension or expulsion.
Because Mississippi school boards are given broad authority in discipline mat-
ters, an ultra vires challenge to academic penalties would not appear to be well-
founded. Where the districts are given such discretion to impose disciplinary
measures in response to misbehavior, the courts have found utilization of aca-
demic penalties to be within that discretionary authority."13
B. On-Campus Searches
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in public
schools.137 The decision, however, confirmed a lessened standard for searches
conducted by school personnel than the probable cause standard applicable to
searches by law enforcement personnel. 138 In New Jersey v. TL. 0., the Court
stated that "the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the rea-
sonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search."139
To determine whether "reasonableness" existed, the Court set out a two-part
test: (1) "'whether ... the action was justified at its inception,"'140 and (2)
"whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably 'related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."'141 Once these el-
ements are established, the school administrator does not need a search warrant in
order to conduct a school-related search.142
To determine whether a search is justified at its inception, school officials can
generally rely on the particular circumstances arousing their suspicion about the
student to be searched. " Where there is "individualized suspicion" that a student
has violated either the law or school rules, justification is easily established."'
Thus, dragnet searches of large numbers of students, without evidence or suspi-
cion of violations of each student searched, generally cannot be justified.
135. Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 237-39 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
136. See Fisher v. Burkburnett Indep. Sch. Dist., 419 R Supp. 1200 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Slocum v. Holton Bd.
of Educ., 429 N.W.2d 607 (Mich. App. 1988); Campbell v. Board of Educ., 475 A.2d 289 (Conn. 1984);
Knight v. Board of Educ., 348 N.E.2d 299 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). On the other hand, courts have found ultra vires
violations in states with more limited authorizing statutes. See Hamer v. Board of Educ., 383 N.E.2d 331 (Ind.
1978); Dorsey v. Bale, 521 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1975).
137. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
138. Id. at 340.
139. Id. at 341.
140. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
141. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
142. Id. at 342.
143. Id. at 341-42.
144. Id. at 342.
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The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized the application of the TL. 0.
"reasonableness" standard to locker searches. 145 In S. C. v. State, the court consid-
ered the search of a student's locker which was conducted after an informant re-
ported that the student had offered to sell two handguns and admitted to having the
guns on campus." The court found that the informant gave the school officials
reasonable grounds to search the locker. 47 Based on a Mississippi constitutional
provision affording privacy" and on the TL. 0. Court's description of "high
school 'reality, '"'49 the court held that a student possesses a legitimate interest to be
"secure in [his]. . . possessions" and, thus, in his school locker.15 ' The court fol-
lowed the usual rule by holding that a student's privacy interest in his locker could
be overridden by the reasonable need to enforce school rules against bringing con-
traband on campus.' 1 The court went further to state that it would make an excep-
tion to the search warrant requirement because the involvement of weapons
created an exigent circumstance. Ms2 This decision seems to imply that the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court will consider school searches on a case by case basis, deter-
mining reasonableness from the school rules and the exigency of the
circumstances.
School districts also retain authority to inspect students' automobiles which are
used as transportation to school, whether they are located on or off school prop-
erty. 53 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that trained dogs may not be
used to search students themselves absent individualized suspicion but that stu-
dents' lockers and cars are fair game for sniffing dogs even where individualized
suspicion has not yet been established."
Absent exigent circumstances, strip searches are generally disapproved as be-
ing excessively intrusive.155 Although neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme
Court has issued opinions specifically involving the constitutionality of student
strip searches, the Supreme Court has refused to hear cases where appellate courts
declare such searches, conducted under unexceptional circumstances, to be un-
145. 583 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1991).
146. Id. at 189. Two assistant principals obtained the student's locker number but found it locked. Id. The stu-
dent voluntarily opened the lock and the principals found the guns inside a bag hanging in the locker. Id.
147. Id. at 191. The court stated that "[absent information that a particular student informant may be untrust-
worthy, school officials may ordinarily accept at face value the information they supply." Id. at 192.
148. Id. (citing Miss. CoNsT. art. III, § 23 (1890)).
149. S. C., 583 So. 2d at 191. The court relied on a discussion in TL. 0. which stated that a student should not
have to waive all rights to privacy in certain personal items that he must bring in addition to school supplies. Id.
(citing TL.O., 469 U.S. at 339).
150. Id. at 191-92.
151. S. C., 583 So. 2d at 192.
152. Id.
153. See Coronado v. State, 806 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App. 1991). Compare S. C., 583 So. 2d at 192, where the
court stated that a student's expectation of privacy in a school locker "is considerably less than he would have in
the privacy of his home or even, perhaps, his automobile." Id.
154. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207
(1983); see also Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 935
(1990).
155. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 631 E2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
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constitutional." 6 Thus, it appears that a district may safely limit strip searches to
cases involving the possession of drugs, weapons or other such items which would
pose an imminent and serious danger to the student or others. 157
C. Corporal Punishment
In the landmark case of Ingraham v. Wright,"5 8 the Supreme Court held that the
use of corporal punishment in the classroom does not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.159 Further, the Court held
that due process does not require notice and hearing prior to disciplining a student
with corporal punishment. 60
In accordance with Ingraham, the Fifth Circuit has consistently found that the
use of reasonable corporal punishment does not violate the Constitution.161 "Rea-
sonable" corporal punishment has been identified as that which is not "arbitrary,
capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an atmo-
sphere conducive to learning." 62 Where the punishment has been shown to be rea-
sonable, the Fifth Circuit has continually refused to recognize federal claims
which seek recovery for injuries resulting from disciplinary paddlings, "irrespec-
tive of the severity of the injuries or the sensitivity of the student[s] ."63 In every
case, the court's refusal to recognize a cause of action is premised on two factors.
First, the educator who administered the punishment was able to show a reason-
able relationship between the student's offense and the discipline received. 164 Sec-
ond, state law was found to have provided adequate civil and/or criminal remedies
which the student might have sought against the educator individually. 65
Mississippi law does not prohibit corporal punishment. However, pursuant to
general authority to prescribe and enforce rules, a Mississippi school board may
prohibit, limit or otherwise condition the use of corporal punishment within its
district.166 Where no local prohibition or limitation exists, Mississippi educators
may legally use reasonable corporal punishment for purposes of discipline.
156. See Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); Doe v.
Renfrow, 631 F.2d91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
157. The Sixth Circuit recently found a strip search to be justified from the inception where school officials
first received a confidential student tip, obtained statements from the father concerning his daughter's drug use,
and retrieved drugs in an initial search. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991). But see Bellnier v.
Lund, 438 F Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (strip search not reasonable where conducted to find three dollars
stolen, in view of lack of seriousness, exigency, or prevalence of problem and in consideration of age and chil-
dren's history).
158. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
159. Id. at 917.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Cunningham
v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989); Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep.
Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1984).
162. Fee, 900 F.2d at 808.
163. Id. See also Cunningham, 858 F.2d at 273; Woodard, 732 F.2d at 1244.
164. Fee, 900 F.2d at 809-10.
165. Id. at 810.
166. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-7-301 (Supp. 1993).
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Mississippi law does provide students with criminal remedies for negligent and
intentional infliction of bodily injury incurred as a result of disciplinary pad-
dlings.' 67 However, a state law expressly grants immunity from civil liability to
teachers, instructional staff members, principals or their designees and bus driv-
ers for actions taken to discipline students.168 This protection is specifically lim-
ited to disciplinary actions which conform with state law and local policy which do
not involve excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment.16 As in other areas
where qualified immunity applies, if the educator acts outside the scope and au-
thority of his employment, he is highly subject to the loss of such immunity."' °
Therefore, the utilization of corporal punishment should be in complete compli-
ance with the standard of reasonableness with any local board policy regarding
discipline procedures and, of course, with both the professional and personal
judgment of the educator.
D. Freedom of Religion
The First Amendment, as it relates to religion, contains both the establishment
and free exercise clauses: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . 171 Both apply to
public school districts.
1. The Establishment Clause
Mississippi law advances this constitutional prohibition by forbidding the
teaching of any doctrinal, sectarian or denominational matters in its public
schools.172 The seminal decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman 73 held that the establish-
ment clause may not be violated.' 74 An exception is allowed, however, if a district
implements a religion-related course or uses religion-related symbols so long as
the district's purpose is secular in nature, a "principal or primary effect [of the ac-
tivity] neither advances nor inhibits religion,""7 and the activity does not foster
excessive entanglements with religion. 7' If these requisites are met, the course
does not violate the establishment clause.' 77 The permissiveness of a district's
actions under the establishment clause must be determined by the purpose, nature
and result of the act. 1
78
167. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 (Supp. 1993) (simple and aggravated assault).
168. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57 (Supp. 1993).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
172. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-3 (1990).





178. Id. at 612-13.
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Mississippi law allows teachers to permit voluntary prayer by students;17 9 how-
ever, organized devotional prayers in public schools have been held to violate the
establishment clause even where participation is voluntary.' 80 State-directed and
authorized periods of silence for meditation and voluntary prayer have been found
to be violative as well.
181
In Jager v. Douglas County School District,182 the Eleventh Circuit first held that
invocations given before football games were violative of the establishment
clause. 83 However, in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,84 the
Fifth Circuit upheld a district's right to allow graduation invocations.185 The Fifth
Circuit was required to revisit the graduation prayer issue after the United States
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Clear Creek case following its decision
in Lee v. Weisman. 86
In Lee, the Court held that a Rhode Island district's practice of permitting mid-
dle and high school principals to invite a clergy member to present prayers at offi-
cial graduation ceremonies violated the establishment clause, finding the activity
to be impermissibly "pervasive" involvement "with religious activity." 1 87 The Lee
prayers consisted of non-denominational invocations and benedictions, no longer
than one minute in length, delivered by a local rabbi. 88 The principal had decided
that the prayers should be given, chose the religious participant, and directed and
controlled the prayer's content by giving the rabbi written and oral guidelines for
preparing nonsectarian prayers.' 89 The school officials also exercised a high de-
gree of control over the timing, movements, dress and decorum of the students. 190
Taking these factors together, the Court found them to constitute "pervasive" in-
volvement with religion and unlawfully imposed "social pressure [tending] to en-
force orthodoxy"'' on the students objecting to the prayers, even though the
students were not required to attend the ceremony in order to receive their diplo-
mas.1
92
Notwithstanding the Lee decision, the Fifth Circuit did not alter its decision in
Clear Creek. In Clear Creek, high school seniors were permitted, but not required,
to "choose student volunteers to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invoca-
179. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-4 (1990). Teachers are prohibited from prescribing the form or content of any
prayer. Id.
180. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
181. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
182. 862 F.2d 824 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
183. Id.
184. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
185. Id.
186. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
187. Id. at 2655.
188. Id. at 2652.
189. Id. at 2660 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2651.
192. Id.
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tions at their graduation ceremonies."1 93 The students presented the district with
their proposed invocation for approval by a majority vote of the senior class.194
Finding that the school was legitimately concerned with solemnizing its gradua-
tion ceremonies, the court stated that the prayer procedure simply permitted each
senior class to decide how to best achieve that end.19
The Clear Creek court analyzed the district's prayer policy and procedure under
each element of the traditional Lemon test. I Until specific further direction from
the Supreme Court is given, such analysis will be necessary under each district's
given set of facts to ensure that district practice does not violate the establishment
clause.
2. Free Exercise Clause
Generally while at school, students have the right to express their religious be-
liefs in a nondisruptive manner. Students enjoy the right to identify their religious
beliefs through signs and symbols as long as they do not materially and substan-
tially interfere with the school's operation or collide with the rights of others.197
Several other types of "religious" activities in the schools have been found by the
courts to be permissible. Students have the right to talk about their beliefs on cam-
pus;'98 to distribute religious literature on campus; 9 9 to pray on campus;2 0 to
carry or study the Bible or other religious writings on campus;20' to do research
papers, speeches and creative projects with religious themes;20 2 to be exempt from
activities due to conflicts with religious beliefs;20. and to celebrate and study reli-
gious holidays on campus.20 4 Students also have the right, in certain instances, to
participate in religious clubs on campus.2°5
In Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,2"' the Su-
preme Court found that a Nebraska high school violated the 1984 Equal Access
Act when it refused to let students in a Christian prayer group meet after school.207
The Court held that a "limited open forum" exists whenever a public secondary
school gives the opportunity for one or more non-curriculum related student
193. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963,964 (5th Cir. 1992).
194. Id. at 969.
195. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). The court concluded: "By attending
graduation to experience and participate in the community's display of support for the graduates, people should
not be surprised to find the event affected by community standards. The Constitution requires nothing different."
Id. at 972.
196. Id. at 965 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
197. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
198. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
199. See Hazlewood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
200. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
201. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
202. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
203. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
204. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
205. See infra notes 206-07.
206. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
207. Id. at 253.
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groups to meet on school grounds during noninstructional time, before or after
classes.208 The Court stated that a club may be "curriculum related" under four
conditions: (1) "the subject matter. . . is actually. . . or will soon be taught, in a
regularly offered course;" (2) "the subject matter . . . concerns the body of
courses as a whole;" (3) "participation. . . is required for a particular course;" or
(4) "participation. .. results in academic credit."2"' Where one "non-curriculum
related" club is allowed, the school may not deny equal access to another group,
such as the Bible group which was the subject of the Mergens case.2 10 Further-
more, the Court held that the school must officially recognize such organizations
by allowing them "to be part of the student activities program, [including] access
to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, public address system,"211 and any other
school-sponsored publication or event.212
With regard to sponsorship of religious groups, the Court noted that school of-
ficials are expressly prohibited from participating at meetings of student religious
groups. 213 Non-school persons are prohibited from directing, controlling or regu-
larly attending the activities of such clubs.214 The assignment of school personnel
to such meetings is permitted but for custodial purposes only. 21  No school person
so assigned may act to monitor the content of speech at the meetings. 216 As with
most other federal statutory law, failure to comply with the provisions of the Equal
Access Act will subject the school to possible forfeiture of federal funds.217
E. Freedom of Speech
In the landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,21 8 the
Supreme Court established the right of students to freedom of expression in the
absence of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech. 219 The Court es-
tablished a strict standard of review in student free speech cases, requiring that the
district show a material and substantial disruption justifying restriction of the stu-
dents' speech .220 However, subsequent Court decisions have worked together to
limit this rigorous standard.221
The Court has recognized that the primary aim of the First Amendment is "the
full protection of speech upon issues of public concern." 222 In Bethel School Dis-
208. Id. at 235 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 4072(3) (1988)).
209. Id. at 239-40.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 247.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 251-53.
214. Id. at 253.
215. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 4072(2) (1988)).
216. Id.
217.20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
218. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
219. Id. at 511.
220. Id. at 513.
221. See supra notes 222-227 and accompanying text.
222. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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trict No. 403 v. Fraser,22 the Court emphasized the difference between expres-
sions of public and of private concern, finding that the school district had the
responsibility and the right to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language and
"that the determination of what manner of speech is inappropriate in school prop-
erly rests with the school board."224 The Bethel Court found that where the stu-
dent's expression conveys only a generalized message or is deemed to be
inappropriate for school purposes, the district need only have a reasonable basis
for restricting the offending expression.22
School district policies that limit student expression must strike a balance be-
tween the students' rights under the First Amendment and the district's responsi-
bility to maintain a nondisruptive learning environment. Reading Tinker together
with Bethel and the other subsequent free speech cases, it is apparent that districts
can regulate student speech by implementing codes of conduct and dress with re-
strictions rationally related to preventing disruptions and maintaining discipline.
In all instances districts can forbid dress, conduct or language which is vulgar, in-
decent, obscene or insulting, as well as prohibit such that carries a message pro-
moting or encouraging behavior contrary to valid educational purposes. When
student conduct is deemed to be expressive of some matter of public concern,
however, the district must not regulate such conduct unless it would cause a mate-
rial or substantial disruption.
2
1
E Release of Student Records
The Family Education and Privacy Act of 1974 regulates the availability and
release of educational records .228 The Privacy Act conditions the receipt of federal
funds upon compliance with its provisions, which generally prohibit the release of
most student information without parental consent.229
The term "education records" refers to records, files, documents or other mate-
rials which contain information directly related to a student and are maintained by
school districts .230 However, records not protected under the Privacy Act do not
include those items in the possession of teachers and other educational personnel
relating to instruction, 231 records maintained solely for law enforcement purposes,
223. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Fraser concerned the disciplining of a student for giving a sexually explicit speech at
a school assembly. Id.
224.Id. at 683.
225. Id. at 685.
226. Id. at 683. Messages pertaining to smoking, drinking, drug use, or physical or sexual violence can be pro-
hibited under Bethel. Id. at 684.
227. Id. at 688.
228. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1988 & Supp. 1992).
229. A violation of the Privacy Act has been held to be "good cause" for the termination of a public school
employee's employment. Harrison County Sch. Bd. v. Morreale, 538 So. 2d 1196 (Miss. 1989).
230. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
231. The Privacy Act exempts records in the possession of "instructional, supervisory, administrative, or
other educational personnel." Id. Those types of materials are not available to any other person except a substitute
teacher. Id.
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employee records and medical records made in the provision of treatment of the
student. 
2 32
Districts may release certain "directory information" if it has first given paren-
tal and public notice of the categories of information that will be released .233 "Di-
rectory information" includes a student's name, address, telephone number, date
and place of birth, major field of study, participation in officially recognized
sports and activities, dates of attendance, height of members of athletic teams, de-
grees and awards received and the last school attended.1
34
Districts must not deny or prevent parents the right to inspect and review the
education records of their children.2 35 This right applies evenly to custodial and
noncustodial parents, regardless of the wishes of either.238 Districts must notify
parents and students of their rights under the Privacy Act.237 When a student
reaches age eighteen, however, the permission or consent necessary under the Pri-
vacy Act is required of the student and not the parents. 238
Districts must implement appropriate procedures which allow granting access
to records no later than forty-five days after a request is made.239 Where parents
request to access records which contain information on more than one student,
districts may allow them to view only those portions of the document relating to
their student or may inform them of the information contained in the document as
it relates to their student.240
Districts must provide parents with an opportunity for a hearing if they wish to
contest the content of their student's records.241 Such a hearing must allow an op-
portunity to correct or delete any inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise inappro-
priate data and to insert into the record a written explanation of the parents'
challenge.242
To release student records to persons other than parents, districts must obtain a
parent's consent, except when access is requested by one of the following parties:
(1) other district officials, including teachers who the district determines have le-
gitimate educational interests; (2) authorized representatives of the government;
(3) parties in connection with financial aid; (4) "[s]tate and local officials or au-
thorities [who must report such information] pursuant to state statute adopted
prior to November 19, 1974; "121 (5) "accrediting organizations in order to carry
232. Id.
233. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
234. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(A) (1988).
235. Miss. CODE ANN. § 95-5-24 (Supp. 1992).
236. See Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21,32-33 (2d Cir. 1986). Mississippi law specifically
provides for the availability to noncustodial parents of all records pertaining to a minor child, including school
records. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (Supp. 1993).
237. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(e) (1988).
238. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(d) (Supp. 1992).
239. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (1988).
240. Id.
241. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (Supp. 1992).
242. Id.
243. No such Mississippi statute exists.
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our their accrediting functions;" (6) parents of dependent study students; (7) ap-
propriate persons in the case of an emergency and subject to federal regulations,
"if the knowledge. . . is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or
other persons;" (8) "officials of other schools or school systems in which the stu-
dent seeks or intends to enroll, upon condition that the student's parents be notified
of the transfer, receive a copy of the record if desired, and have an opportunity for
a hearing to challenge the content of the record;" and (9) "organizations conduct-
ing studies for educational agencies or institutions for the purpose[s]" of testing,
student aid programs or instructional improvement, under certain conditions. 2
The Privacy Act further provides that if a lawfully executed subpoena demands
release of student information, no parental permission is necessary, but the district
must notify the parent prior to compliance.245 Additionally, federal or state educa-
tion authorities may obtain, without parental consent or notification, information
necessary for audit and evaluation of federally-funded programs or enforcement of
legal requirements specific to such programs, conditioned upon the removal of
personally identifiable information and upon the destruction of the records after
utilization. 2"'
Districts must maintain a record of all requests for access to be kept with each
student file.247 Such record must include the legitimate interest of the requesting
party and may be available only to the parents, school officials and record custodi-
ans.24 Districts may release personal information only if the receiving party
agrees to deny access to such information to any other person without the consent
of the parents. 249
III. EMPLOYMENT MATTERS
Mississippi law charges public school principals with the duty to recommend to
the superintendent all instructional and n'oninstructional personnel to be employed
within their schools.250 If the recommendations meet with the superintendent's ap-
proval, the superintendent must then recommend employment to the school
board '51 The school board is required to elect the recommended personnel unless
"good reason to the contrary exists."252
244. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A)-(I) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
245. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
246. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(3), (5) (1988).
247. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(A) (1988).
248. Id.
249. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(B) (1988).
250. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-17 (1990). Principals are required to recommend to the superintendent new cer-
tificated or noninstructional employees on or before April I of each year. Id. School boards are authorized to
designate up to two personnel supervisors or another principal to make employment recommendations for a prin-
cipal or to accept the recommendations for transmittal to the school board. Id.
251. Id. § 37-9-17 (1990). The superintendent has the ultimate responsibility to see that all necessary certifi-
cated and noninstructional personnel are retained. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-9-3, -14(a)(t) (1990 & Supp. 1993).
252. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-17 (1990).
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Mississippi law imposes a limited nepotism prohibition in district hiring prac-
tices.2"3 A school board is prohibited from hiring a superintendent, principal or
other certificated employee who is related within the third degree by blood or mar-
riage to a majority of the school board members. 2" A board is also prohibited
from hiring any person whose employment would pose a conflict of interest.2"'
A. Assignment of Personnel
The district superintendent has the authority to make assignments of all certifi-
cated employees within the district.2"6 This power is controlled by two statutory
limitations: (1) the employee may be assigned or reassigned only to a position for
which he holds a valid certificate; and (2) the assignment or reassignment may be
reviewed by the Board on the employee's request.257 Recognizing that the true pur-
pose of public school districts is to educate children and not to provide employment
opportunities for adults, the Mississippi Supreme Court has acknowledged the
statutory intent to allow broad discretion in assignment of personnel.258 Thus, in
accordance with statutory and contractual language, superintendents maintain a
fair amount of discretion in determining the appropriateness of employee reas-
signment. Employees do have the right, however, to request that the school board
review objectionable reassignments.2 9 Numerous lawful reasons for reassign-
ment exist, including maintenance of faculty discipline and adjustment due to en-
rollment shifts. However, a decision to reassign an employee must not be based on
any unlawful reason, such as discrimination, harassment or retaliation for the ex-
ercise of a constitutional right.28
The Fifth Circuit has analyzed the standards by which a public school reassign-
ment is to be judged. In Fyfe v. Curlee,261 a secretary employed by a public school
district enrolled her daughter in an all-white private academy contrary to the
wishes of the superintendent.262 The superintendent requested that the secretary
253. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-21 (1990).
254. Id.
255. Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 109; Miss. CoDE ANN. §25-4-101 to 25-4-119 (1991 & Supp. 1993). Basically,
the law prohibits a public officer or member of the state legislature from having direct or indirect interest in a
contract which is authorized by any law passed or order made by any board of which he was a member. Id. § 25-
4-105. Statute limits this prohibition for a one year period following the end of a public employee's tenure. Id. See
Smith v. Dorsey (Smith II), 599 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1992); Smith v. Dorsey (Smith I), 530 So. 2d 5 (Miss. 1988);
see also Waller v. Moore, ex re/. Quitman County Sch. Dist., 604 So. 2d 265 (Miss. 1992).
256. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-14(2)(s) (Supp. 1993).
257. Id. The State Board of Education prescribes the form of the contract. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-23 (1990).
The state-issued form contract includes a standard reassignment clause stating that the employee agrees to reas-
signment during the year to any area in which he holds a valid certificate.
258. Holliday v. West Point Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 401 So. 2d 1296, 1301 (Miss. 1981).
259. Miss. CoDa ANN. § 37-9-12(2)(s) (1990).
260. See Claiborne County Bd. of Educ. v. Martin, 500 So. 2d 981, 985 (Miss. 1986) (though possessing
broad authority, school boards must act within constitutional limits).
261. 902 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 940 (1990). The plaintiff brought her action pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights. Id.
262. Although not discussed in Fyfe, Mississippi law specifically prohibits school districts from denying em-
ployment or reemployment to any person for the sole reason that a child of that person does not attend school in
the employing district. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-59 (1990).
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resign; but, when she refused, he created a menial job for her at the school's re-
source center and instituted conditions of employment which prevented her from
going into the schools or having breaks with fellow employees.263 The court stated
that a person does not lose the right to send his child to a private school by accept-
ing employment with a public school system and that an employment decision
based on the exercise of such right is constitutionally impermissible unless the
school could demonstrate that the conduct materially and substantially interfered
with the effectiveness of the school system.2" The mere belief that such interfer-
ence may occur, without any supporting objective evidence, was found to be insuf-
ficient to demonstrate material interference which would justify quelling the
employee's exercise of her constitutional right.26 Applying those standards, the
court found that the superintendent had violated the secretary's constitutional
rights and ordered reinstatement to her former position.266
In addition to ensuring that a reassignment does not violate the employee's
rights under the law, a superintendent must also determine that a reassignment
does not constitute an improper demotion .267 The central value of employment to
be protected is responsibility; salary and title are not necessarily determinative as
to whether a demotion has occurred.2 8 In the landmark desegregation case, Sin-
gleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District,269 the Fifth Circuit set forth
these strict requirements by which a demotion was to be judged:
Demotion . . . includes any reassignment (1) under which the staff member re-
ceives less pay or has less responsibility than under the assignment he held previ-
ously, (2) which requires a lesser degree of skill than did the assignment he held
previously, or (3) under which the staff member is asked to teach a subject or grade
other than one for which he is certified or for which he has had substantial experi-
ence within a reasonably current period.270
Although the strict requirements of Singleton are not applicable in the absence of
desegregation-related reductions in staff members, Singleton-based decisions pro-
vide guidance when trying to determine whether a reassignment is actually a de-
motion.271
In Jones v. Birdsong,272 finding that the counselor did not suffer a decrease in
wages and was certified to teach the class to which she was assigned, the court
263. Fyfe, 902 F.2d at 405.
264. Id. at 404.
265. Id. at 405.
266. Id. The court directed that on remand consideration be given to the secretary's claims fbr mental anguish,
constructive discharge and attorney's fees. Id.
267. Id.
268. Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 563 F.2d 1159, 1161 (5th Cir. 1977).
269. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.), vacated in part, 396 U.S. 226 (1969).
270. Singleton, 419 F.2d at 1218.
271. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
272. 530 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Miss. 1980), affd, 679 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1202
(1983).
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held that the reassignment of a counselor to teaching duties was not a demotion.273
The court found that the counselor and teacher positions required similar levels of
skill and were of equal importance and prestige.274 Importantly, the court also
stated that the source of funds used for compensation of the position -whether
federal, state or local- was not a valid concern in determining demotion where
full payment of salary was received by the employee.27s The Jones court affirmed
the general principle that "[s]chool administrators are entitled to exercise responsi-
ble professional judgment in the assignment of personnel to conduct the changing
course work offered in their schools, without interference from the. . . courts. "278
In order to determine whether two positions actually are on different employ-
ment levels, the courts have clearly looked beyond the subjective opinions of the
employees. In Lee v. Russell County Board of Education,277 the court refused to al-
low the desirability of one position over another to control the determination,
holding that a transfer from a high school counseling assignment to an elementary
counseling assignment held equal responsibility and thus was not a demotion.278
Likewise, demotions have not been found where a principal was transferred from
high school to elementary school279 or where a teacher was transferred from one
type course to another.280 Although not specifically addressing the issue of demo-
tion, the Mississippi Supreme Court also considered the reduction in salary and
responsibilities in finding that the reassignment of a principal to a teaching posi-
tion effectively amounted to a nonrenewal of the principal's contract and an offer of
a new contract. 281
Whether a district may properly reassign a certificated employee to non-in-
structional duties has not been addressed by Mississippi courts. Other jurisdic-
tions provide conflicting views on this issue. Where a teacher can be given a
non-teaching assignment that bears a reasonable relationship to the teacher's com-
petence and training and that is consistent with the dignity of the profession, a
temporary reassignment for disciplinary or other reasons may be upheld.282
Where the employee does not lose any salary, a temporary reassignment to non-




277. 563 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1977).
278. Id. at 1162.
279. Bassett v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Dist., 485 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1973). Note, however, that the Fifth Circuit
more recently recognized that "the head of a high school can properly be said to have more responsibility than the
head of an elementary school." Lee, 563 F.2d at 1162.
280. McLaurin v. Columbia Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 530 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1976).
281. Desoto County Sch. Bd. v. Garrett, 508 So. 2d 1091 (Miss. 1987). Although the court did not label the
district's action a "demotion," it did recognize that a reduction in responsibilities and salary would invoke the
employee's rights under the School Employment Procedures Law (SEPA). Id. at 1094.
282. Alderstein v. Board of Educ., 474 N.E.2d 209 (N.Y. 1984).
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teaching duties may also be permitted. 283 On the other hand, a total deprivation of
teaching responsibilities may be found to constitute a constructive discharge. 2
The standard Mississippi contract provision regarding assignment obligates the
employee to perform duties "required by law" as well as those prescribed under
"policies, rules and regulations of the board."285 It could be argued that this con-
tract language refers only to those duties which can be attributable or related to the
contracted position. However, logical justification for reassignment to certain
non-instructional duties may arise. Administrative office assignments which are
geared toward development, implementation and maintenance of instructional
programs would certainly bear a "reasonable relationship" to a teacher's training.
Such duties could arguably be considered professional and nonmenial. Addition-
ally, placement in merely supervisory or nonacademic positions would serve the
best interest of the teacher where dismissal or suspension are the other alterna-
tives. The superintendent should carefully examine the character of any contem-
plated noninstructional duties and avoid such reassignment if at all possible.
However, temporary placement in a productive and professional position which
would not present a deprivation of responsibility or prestige or a loss in salary
could be acceptable under certain circumstances.
B. Certificated Employees
Teachers, principals, superintendents and other instructional personnel must
hold a proper certificate through the state department of education in order to
teach or serve in a public school. 288 The contract 287 of a certificated employee can
be rendered null and -void in the event the employee is released from the contract
by order of the board or if the employee abandons or breaches his contract. 2a Oth-
erwise, a district can end the employment of a certificated employee only by ter-
mination or nonrenewal of the contract.
1. Mid-Year Removal of the Certificated Employee
The superintendent may remove any certificated employee by mid-year termi-
nation or suspension for incompetence, neglect of duty, immoral conduct, intem-
283. Dooley v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 866 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107
(1989).
284. See Haag v. Board of Educ., 655 F Supp. 1267 (N.D. I11. 1987); Hansen v. Board of Educ., 502 N.E.2d
467 (I11. App. Ct. 1986).
285. Iss. CoDE ANN. § 37-7-301 (Supp. 1993).
286. The certification process is governed by rules and regulations adopted and implemented by the State De-
partment of Education. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-23 (1990).
287. All certificated employees must enter into a contract with the employing district for no less than 185 days.
Miss. CoDE ANN. § 37-9-24 (1990). The salaries of all certificated employees are required to be in compliance
with the state's minimum education program. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-33 (1990).
288. Miss. CoDE ArN. §§ 37-9-55, -57 (1990).
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perance, brutal treatment of a student or other good cause.289 Before being
removed, the employee must be notified of charges against him and advised of his
right to a public hearing on those charges. 29 The employee must request a hearing
within five calendar days from the date of the notice of termination or suspension
or his right to such a hearing is deemed waived and his termination or suspension
effective as of the date of the notice.29' If the employee properly requests a hear-
ing, the statutory procedures provided for nonrenewals under the School Employ-
ment Procedures Law292 (commonly referred to as SEPA) are invoked.293 A
termination or suspension hearing must be held not sooner than five days nor later
than thirty days from the date the hearing was requested. 94
When a notice of termination or suspension has been issued, circumstances
may permit the superintendent to release the employee from his duties immedi-
ately.29 An employee may be released if his continued presence on campus poses a
potential threat or danger to the students or if, in the superintendent's discretion,
his continued presence may interfere with or cause a disruption of normal school
operations.2 9 If the employee has been arrested, indicted or otherwise charged
with a felony, his continued presence on campus is statutorily deemed to constitute
a disruption of school operations, and his immediate removal is automatically per-
mitted.2 97 In any case, if the employee is released from his duties pending a hear-
ing, the district must continue to compensate him up to and including the date that
the initial hearing is set by the board.2 98
At a termination or suspension hearing, the burden rests upon the superintend-
ent to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that adequate grounds for the ad-
verse employment action exists.' 9' The hearing is conducted in accordance with
the procedures under SEPA300 discussed infra.3 ' If the employee is not satisfied
with the school board's decision after hearing, he may appeal to the Mississippi
289. MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-59 (1990). Insubordination has long been recognized as "other good cause"
within the meaning of this statute. Merchant v. Board of Trustees, 492 So. 2d 959 (Miss. 1986). Mississippi law
defines "insubordination" as a constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reason-
able in nature, and given by and with proper authority. Sims v. Board of Trustees, 414 So. 2d 431 (Miss. 1982).
290. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 37-9-59 (1990).
291. Id.
292. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 37-9-101 (1990).
293. Id. The procedures to be implemented are set forth in Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111 (1990).
294. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 37-9-111 (1990). Although not expressly provided in Miss. CoDE ANN. § 37-9-59,
SEPA allows the parties to agree to a continuance beyond the stated time period. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-
111(1) (1990).




299. Merchant v. Pearl Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 492 So. 2d 959, 961 (Miss. 1986) (citing Mississippi Em-
ployment Sec. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 437 So. 2d 388, 393 n.4 (Miss. 1983); Sims v.
Board of Trustees, 414 So. 2d 431,434 (Miss. 1982)).
300. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-9-100 to - 113 (1990).
301. See infra notes 303-42 and accompanying text.
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Chancery Court in accordance with the procedures under SEPA, also discussed
infra.
30 2
2. Nonrenewal of the Certificated Employee
While Mississippi's public school teachers are not granted tenure under the law,
certificated employees are provided with certain rights protecting their property
interest in continued employment.3 °3 SEPA mandates the implementation of cer-
tain procedural safeguards when a certificated employee is not going to be offered
a renewal contract in the district for the following school year.304 All certificated
employees are protected under SEPA, including teachers, principals, superintend-
ents and other certified professionals, such as athletic directors and coaches.30 5
The district superintendent is required to submit recommendations for contract
renewals and nonrenewals to the school board for action no later than February 15
for principals and assistant principals30 6 and no later than April 1 for teachers and
other employees.307 Upon receipt, the school board must vote to accept or not ac-
cept the superintendent's recommendations .308 The board must then give notice to
each employee for whom a renewal contract has not been recommended. 39 Such
notice must be given on or before February 1 for superintendents, March 1 for
principals, and April 8 for teachers and other professional educators. 0
With the notice that nonrenewal has been recommended, the employee should
also receive notice of his right to request a hearing in the matter of his nonrene-
wal.311 If the employee does not request a hearing, the nonrenewal becomes fi-
nal .312 If the employee makes a written request for a hearing, he becomes entitled
to several enumerated rights. 313 First, at least five days before the hearing, he must o
be provided with the reasons for nonrenewal, including a summary of the facts
supporting each reason.31 4 Second, he must be given the opportunity to present
matters relevant to the reasons given for the nonrenewal, including any matters
302. See infra notes 303-42 and accompanying text.
303. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-9-100 to -113 (1990).
304. Id.
305. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-103 (1990). See Merchant v. Board of Trustees, 492 So. 2d 959 (Miss. 1986)
(athletic director and coach); Tutwiler v. Jones, 394 So. 2d 1346 (Miss. 1981) (superintendent); Jackson v.
Board of Educ., 349 So. 2d 550 (Miss. 1977) (drug education specialist); Dampier v. Lawrence County Sch.
Dist., 344 So. 2d 130 (Miss. 1977) (librarian).
306. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-15 (Supp. 1993).
307. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-17 (1990).
308. Leake County Sch. Dist. v. Duren, 591 So. 2d 813 (Miss. 1991).
309. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-105 (1990). Failure to give timely notice pursuant to this statute will result in the
automatic renewal of the employee's current contract. Merchant v. Board of Trustees, 492 So. 2d 959 (Miss.
1986); Noxubee County Sch. Bd. v. Cannon, 485 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1986); Robinson v. Board of Trustees, 477
So. 2d 1352 (Miss. 1985). Furthermore, this initial notice need not include the reasons for the nonrenewal rec-
ommendation; indeed, the superintendent should not have presented and the board should not have yet consid-
ered any reasons therefor. See, e.g., Merchant, 492 So. 2d at 959; Noxubee, 485 So. 2d at 302.
310. Id.
311. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-105 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-109(a) (1990).
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which he alleges to be the actual reasons for nonrenewal31 s He is further entitled
to a fair and impartial hearing before the board or a hearing officer and to be repre-
sented by an attorney at his own expense.316
The hearing must be held not sooner than five days nor later than thirty days
from the date of the request unless otherwise agreed upon by the district and em-
ployee.3 17 The school board may conduct the hearing, or it may retain a hearing
officer to do so.318 The hearing officer may be one of the board members, a dis-
trict employee other than the one who made the initial nonrenewal decision, or
some other qualified and impartial person."9 A board member or hearing officer
may be disqualified from hearing a case where he is shown to have bias resulting
from personal animosity or personal or financial stake in the decision.3 20 The
school board may utilize its own attorney to prosecute the case, to advise the board
or to conduct the hearing unless it can be shown that the participation of the board
attorney destroys the impartiality of the proceeding.
321
The hearing procedure should afford the employee with the right to present wit-
nesses and other evidence and to cross-examine witnesses against him. 22 How-
ever, the hearing is an informal procedure that does not invoke the formality of
trial and does not require adherence to the rules of evidence or procedure.323 Be-
cause the hearing record may provide the basis for the employee's legal appeal in
the event of an adverse decision, the hearing must be properly transcribed and the
witnesses should be required to testify under oath.324
At the nonrenewal hearing, the burden of proof is on the employee to prove af-
firmatively and conclusively that the reasons for nonrenewal had no basis in fact
or that the nonrenewal was contrary to law. 321 If the employee claims a violation of
a constitutional right, such as free speech or freedom of religion, he can gain a
rebuttable presumption that the nonrenewal was for impermissible reasons by
showing that he engaged in constitutionally protected activity and that the reason
given for nonrenewal was false or a sham.326 However, the administration may
overcome the presumption by showing that it would have rationally made the
315. MIss. CODE AN. § 37-9-109(b) (1990).
316. MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-109(c), (d) (1990).
317. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111(1) (1990).
318. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111(2) (1990).
319. Id.
320. Spradlin v. Board of Trustees, 515 So. 2d 893, 898 (Miss. 1987) (citing Dampier v. Lawrence County
Sch. Dist., 344 So. 2d 130, 132 (Miss. 1977)).
321. Hoffman v. Board of Trustees, 567 So. 2d 838 (Miss. 1990).
322. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111(2) (1990).
323. MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111(5) (1990). See Noxubee County Bd. of Educ. v. Givens, 481 So. 2d 816,
820 (Miss. 1985).
324. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111(3) (1990). In the case of appeal, the cost of the transcript is assessed as
court costs. Id.
325. Claiborne COunty Bd. of Educ. v. Martin, 500 So. 2d 981,985 (Miss. 1986); Tanner v. Hazlehurst Mun.
Separate Sch. Dist., 427 So. 2d 977 (Miss. 1983); Cox v. Thomas, 403 So. 2d 135 (Miss. 1981); Calhoun
County Bd. of Educ. v. Hamblin, 360 So. 2d 1236 (Miss. 1978).
326. Martin, 500 So. 2d at 985.
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same nonrenewal decision in the absence of the protected conduct.327 If the em-
ployee fails to carry his burden of proof, the administration is ordinarily not re-
quired to justify its decision.328
The school board must make the final decision in a nonrenewal matter. 329 The
board's decision must be based solely on the evidence received at the hearing.330
Hearsay evidence may be properly admitted into evidence at a nonrenewal hear-
ing, but the board cannot make a determination of facts based solely on hearsay
evidence.33 If the board has used a hearing officer to conduct the hearing, the em-
ployee has the right to appear before the board prior to it making a final deci-
sion .332 If the board finds that the nonrenewal was not a proper employment
decision, it can order the execution of a new one-year contract.33 3 In any event, the
board must give the employee notice of its final decision within thirty days of the
close of the hearing if it was conducted by a hearing officer or within ten days if it
was conducted by the board .3 The employee may appeal an adverse school board
decision to the chancery court .33 An appeal must be filed within twenty days fol-
lowing the final decision of the school boardA" On appeal, the hearing record is
reviewed by chancery court. 337 The court may find the board decision to be unlaw-
ful if the record reveals that the decision was "[n]ot supported by any substantial
evidence,. . . [a]rbitrary or capricious, or [iln violation of statutory or constitu-
tional [law] ."33 The court will consider procedural violations, but harmless error
in complying with SEPA cannot be the basis for reversal of an otherwise proper
327. Id. (citing Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Gates, 461 So. 2d 730, 737 (Miss. 1984); Tanner, 427
So. 2d at 979).
328. Tanner, 427 So. 2d at 979 (because teacher failed to show any impermissible reason for board's nonrene-
wal decision, board was not required to justify its decision); Jones v. Birdsong, 679 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983) (school board may refuse to rehire teacher for whatever reason, so long as it is not
a constitutionally impermissible one); Hamblin, 360 So. 2d at 1239 (statute does not create a substantive right to
reemployment which would require that school board demonstrate good cause for nonreemployment).
329. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111(4) (1990). Where a hearing officer conducts the hearing, the board must
base its decision solely on the record developed at the hearing. Id. Thus, while the statute does not forbid a hear-
ing officer from providing the school board with findings of fact, conclusions of law or a recommendation, the
board is not permitted to rely on such hearing officer reports in making its decision. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. § 37-9-111(5). See Tanner, 427 So. 2d at 979; Stone County Sch. Bd. v. McMaster, 573 So. 2d 753
(Miss. 1990). Section 37-9-111(5) refers to "the determination of facts by the board or hearing officer." Miss.
CODE ANN. § 37-9-111(5) (1990). Thus, it appears that a hearing officer may properly issue findings of fact to
the school board, which it can then determine to be supported or not supported by the record.
332. MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111(4) (1990). Prior to the board voting on the nonrenewal matter, either the
employee or his attorney may present a statement to the board; however, if the record has been closed, no further
witnesses or evidence should be permitted. Id.
333. Id. §37-9-111(6).
334. Id. § 37-9-111(4).
335. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 37-9-113(2) (1990). The proper jurisdiction on appeal is the chancery court in the
judicial district where the school district is located. Id. An appeal is perfected when the employee files a petition
with the court and executes a bond payable to the school board sufficient to satisfy all costs of appeal. Id. Because
the cost of the hearing transcript is deemed to be court costs, the employee's bond should include the price of the
transcript. See Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Gates, 461 So. 2d 730, 738 (Miss. 1984).
336. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-113(2) (1990).
337. Id.
338. Id. § 37-9-113(3).
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board decision. 39 Recognizing that the inherent discretion granted to school ad-
ministrators in discharging their duties should be accorded great weight and defer-
ence, the courts will disturb board action only where the board has exceeded
legally permissible limits or has grossly abused its discretion. 4 Upon a finding of
error, the chancery court can reverse the decision of the school board and order the
issuance of a renewal contract and back pay. 41 Either party may appeal an adverse
chancery court decision to the Mississippi Supreme Court.32
C. Non-Certificated Employees
All employees who are not certificated by the state are classified as "non-
instructional" employees."' Under Mississippi law, these noncontractual employ-
ees are at-will employees who can be terminated at any time, with or without
cause, except where such action would be in violation of the employee's statutory
or constitutional rights."'
Recognizing the at-will status of non-certificated employees, public school dis-
tricts should not structure employment agreements which could be construed as
contractual obligations. Any document issued by the school district for the pur-
pose of verifying employment status should specifically identify the employment
relationship as being at-will.
IV. CONCLUSION
The public's special interest in the operation of its schools often causes height-
ened scrutiny of school board attorneys. Therefore, an attorney must accept both
legal and civic responsibility in representing his public school client. To meet
these demands, the attorney must keep continually updated on the laws and regu-
339. Id. § 37-9-113(4).
340. Claiborne County Bd. of Educ. v. Martin, 500 So. 2d 981,987 (Miss. 1986); Everett v. Board of Trust-
ees, 492 So. 2d 277, 283 (Miss. 1986); Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 242 (Miss.
1985); Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Gates, 461 So. 2d 730, 738 (Miss. 1984).
341. Martin, 500 So. 2d at 987.
342. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-113(5) (1990). The usual appeal procedures are applicable.
343. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-1 (1990).
344. Harrison County Sch. Bd. v. Morreale, 538 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (Miss. 1989). A non-instructional em-
ployee may not be disciplined or discharged in violation of any constitutional right. For example, in McGlothin v.
Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., No. J90-0402(L), 1992 WL 516081 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 30, 1992), afftd, No.
93-7039 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 1993), a teacher's aide sued the school district which had terminated her employment
due to her insubordinate refusal to remove her headcovering in the classroom. The aide claimed that wearing
berets and scarves on her head was an expression of her religious beliefs and alleged that her termination violated
her right to freedom of religion under the first amendment and amounted to religious discrimination under Title
VII. Based on detailed findings of fact, the court concluded the aide did establish that her conduct was the result
of a sincerely held religious belief, but she had not notified the district of such belief prior to her termination.
Compare Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. McGlothin, 556 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1990), where the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court, reviewing only the record developed at the unemployment benefits hearing, found that the
aide's conduct did not constitute "misconduct" under the Mississippi Employment Security Law as it was pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Id. at 325. As a nominal party in that case, the school district did not have the
opportunity to fully develop the evidence as it did in the federal action. These two decisions, arising from the
same employment but with diametrically opposed conclusions, prove that school districts must fully develop,
document and consider all facts upon which an employment decision is to be based, especially where there is an
implication of a constitutional right is a possibility.
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lations as well as the particularized needs and desires of his districts' students and
faculty. Hopefully, this article has provided school board attorneys with a starting
place for continued study of the wide-ranging area of education law.

